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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:50 pm
Time: 8:50 pm
Results for visa security
3 results foundAuthor: Ford, Jess T. Title: Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide Summary: Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas. ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-315: Accessed April 22, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Shelf Number: 121478 Keywords: Border SecurityComputer SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigrationTerrorismVisa Security |
Author: Meyers, Deborah W. Title: Room for Progress: Reinventing Euro-atlantic Borders for a New Strategic Environment Summary: a new MPI report by Deborah W. Meyers, Rey Koslowski and Susan Ginsburg, describes the latest developments in three elements of U.S. and E.U. border management: the recently established enforcement agencies, benefits and limitations of new information technology, and contentious developments surrounding visa-free travel policy. Highlights of ways in which U.S. and E.U. border control converge and diverge include: Whereas in 2006, the United States signed a $2.5 billion contract for the Secure Border Initiative to create a “virtual fence” to complement hundreds of miles of physical fencing, European border authorities tend to focus more on interior enforcement (e.g., at workplaces and points of contact with government agencies). There is increased convergence in strategies, though, with new Department of Homeland Security attempts to step up enforcement in the interior (e.g., at workplaces); In terms of tracking the entry of foreign nationals, both the United States and Europe have made strides. The US-VISIT program processed the entry of more than 76 million foreign visitors to the United States by January 2007. The European Schengen Information System and a secondary databases known as “SIS I+” and “SISone4all,” designed to bolster external border controls so internal border controls can be removed, will enable most of the new EU Member States to lift controls at land borders by January 2008 and at airports in March 2008; Meanwhile, US-VISIT exit controls are not yet in place. Similarly, international travelers leaving the European Union are subject to passport controls at airports and land borders, but SIS is used only for watch-list checks, and Member States have yet to link entry and exit controls; U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s fiscal year 2007 budget totals over $7.8 billion, while FRONTEX’s 2007 budget is €35 million (nearly triple its 2006 budget, but much less than that spent by Member States, which retain responsibility for policing their borders); While U.S. border enforcement agencies seek more staff, soon some E.U. Member States may need less. The United States is having trouble recruiting, training and retaining the border personnel necessary for rapid growth. If CBP reaches 18,000 agents by the end of 2008 as planned, it will have added as many agents in two years as were added in the previous ten. Meanwhile, the Schengen Agreement establishes a single external border for nearly all E.U. Member States, increasingly eliminating the need for border guards at interior borders; The European Union and the United States are both increasingly turning to information technology to screen flows of people in a manner that balances travel facilitation with border security. Halting illegal migration is a principal motivating force behind increasing expenditures on IT systems in Europe and the United States; While the United States has required travelers from Visa Waiver Program countries to carry electronic passports, or “e-passports,” with facial biometric data, U.S. citizens’ passports currently do not all meet this requirement. E.U. Member States have agreed on a requirement their e-passports include fingerprints as well as facial biometrics; In recent years, visa-free travel programs that waive short-term business or tourist visa requirements for nationals of select countries have become increasingly contentious amid heightened security concerns about terrorists who may enter through these programs and fears of increased illegal immigration by people overstaying their visas; and Because all E.U. Member States, except for the United Kingdom and Ireland, belong to the Schengen Area and are treated essentially as a single entity for internal travel, the E.U. claims that visa-waiver status granted to one Member State should apply to all. The United States has engaged in a “consultative process” about Member States’ status, which has not led to clear resolutions. A new U.S. law requires travelers to electronically file travel authorization requests with DHS prior to their departure and gives the Secretary of Homeland Security increased flexibility in setting and administering overstay standards. Ultimately, the authors suggest that U.S. and E.U. policymakers must engage in greater dialogue on the new security systems and structures they are developing, as well as enhance international cooperation on border management, specifically institutional, technological and visa arrangements, if they are to realize their shared goal of securing national and regional borders. Details: Migration Policy Institute, 2007. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EuroAtlanticBorders103107.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EuroAtlanticBorders103107.pdf Shelf Number: 125218 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityImmigrationland SecurityMigrationVisa Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: State Could Enhance Visa Fraud Prevention by Strategically Using Resources and Training Summary: Foreign nationals may apply for entry into the United States under dozens of different visa categories, depending on circumstances. State’s Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security share responsibility for the prevention of visa fraud, which is a serious problem that threatens the integrity of the process. Some documents through illegal means, such as using counterfeit identity documents or making false claims to an adjudicating officer. Visa fraud may facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence, human trafficking, and terrorism. This report examines (1) countries and visa categories that are subject to the most fraud; (2) State's use of technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention. GAO examined State's reports and data on fraud trends and statistics, examined resources and technologies to counter fraud, and observed visa operations and fraud prevention efforts overseas and domestically. Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate. Fraud is also perpetrated for immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas and student visas. In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time. State has a variety of technological tools and resources to assist consular officers in combating fraud, but does not have a policy for their systematic use. For example, State recently implemented fraud prevention technologies such as a fraud case management system that establishes connections among multiple visa applications, calling attention to potentially fraudulent activity. Overseas posts have Fraud Prevention Units that consist of a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and locally employed staff who analyze individual fraud cases. In 2011, the ratio of Fraud Prevention Unit staff to fraud cases varied widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) is a domestic resource available to posts that verifies information on certain visa applications. However, KCC services are only provided on an ad-hoc basis, and State does not have a policy for posts to systematically utilize its resources. For example, an FPM at a high fraud post told GAO that the post would like to utilize KCC anti-fraud services for screening certain visa categories, but did not know how to request KCC assistance. Although State offers anti-fraud training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and online, it does not require FPMs to take them and does not track FPMs’ enrollment. Consular officers receive limited fraud training as part of the initial consular course, and FPMs are not required to take advanced fraud training in new technologies. In addition, GAO found that 81 percent of FPM positions were filled by entry-level officers and 84 percent of FPM positions were designated as either part-time or rotational. Between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up about 21 percent of the total students who registered for a course on detecting fraudulent documents, and State could not guarantee that FPMs were among them. Four out of the five FPMs with whom GAO spoke had not been trained in State's new fraud case management system. GAO recommends that State (1) formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources available at KCC, based on post workload and fraud trends, as determined by the Department and (2) establish requirements for FPM training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to track the extent to which requirements are met. State concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 51p. Source: GAO-12-888 Report to Congressional Requesters: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2012 at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647871.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647871.pdf Shelf Number: 126341 Keywords: Border SecurityCrime PreventionImmigrationVisa SecurityVisas, Fraud |